Angola produced approximately 1.03 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2024, according to Ministry of Mineral Resources, Oil, and Gas (Ministerio dos Recursos Minerais, Petroleo e Gas, MIREMPET) data – a figure that represents roughly half of the country’s 2008 peak of 1.9 million bpd and underscores the structural production decline that dominates the sector outlook. The country’s decision to leave OPEC in January 2024, driven by Luanda’s refusal to accept a reduced production quota, removed external constraints on output but did nothing to address the geological and investment realities driving the decline. Angola’s oil story in 2026 is one of managed decline at the aggregate level, punctuated by new deepwater developments that will partially offset – but not reverse – falling output from mature fields.
Production Profile: The Decline Curve
Angola’s oil production trajectory tells a clear story:
| Year | Production (bpd) | Context |
|---|---|---|
| 2002 | ~900,000 | End of civil war |
| 2008 | ~1,900,000 | All-time peak |
| 2014 | ~1,650,000 | Pre-oil-price-crash |
| 2018 | ~1,470,000 | Structural decline accelerating |
| 2020 | ~1,220,000 | COVID demand destruction |
| 2022 | ~1,170,000 | Partial recovery |
| 2024 | ~1,030,000 | Post-OPEC exit |
The decline is driven by the natural depletion of mature deepwater fields that came onstream between 2004 and 2012, combined with insufficient new development to replace declining volumes. Angola’s deepwater blocks – concentrated in the Lower Congo Basin offshore Luanda and Cabinda – are geologically productive but require sustained capital investment of $3-5 billion annually to maintain production through infill drilling, water injection, and enhanced recovery techniques. During the low-oil-price period of 2015-2020, investment fell below the level needed to maintain output, accelerating the decline.
The government’s production target under the National Development Plan is to stabilise output at approximately 1.1 million bpd by 2027, primarily through the combination of new field developments and enhanced recovery on existing assets. Whether this target is achievable depends almost entirely on the investment decisions of the international oil companies (IOCs) that operate the vast majority of Angola’s production.
Operator Map
Angola’s upstream oil sector is dominated by a handful of international majors, each operating under production-sharing agreements (PSAs) or concession contracts with the Angolan state (through the national oil company, Sonangol, which holds the concessionaire interest in all blocks).
TotalEnergies (35-40% of national production)
TotalEnergies is the single largest operator in Angola, with interests across multiple deepwater blocks that collectively account for an estimated 35-40% of national output. Key assets include:
- Block 17. The crown jewel of Angola’s deepwater production, containing the Girassol, Dalia, Pazflor, and CLOV FPSOs. Block 17 has been in production since 2001 and remains one of the most prolific deepwater developments in the world, though output is declining from peak levels.
- Block 32. Contains the Kaombo development (two FPSOs), which reached plateau production of approximately 230,000 bpd after a 2018 start-up.
- CLOV Phase 3. An infill development on Block 17 designed to extend plateau production from the existing CLOV FPSO through additional subsea tiebacks.
- Begonia. A new development on Block 17/06 that is expected to deliver approximately 30,000 bpd of new production, representing one of the most significant near-term additions to Angola’s output.
TotalEnergies’ deep commitment to Angola reflects both the quality of remaining geological resources and the company’s historical relationship with Sonangol dating back to the Elf Aquitaine era.
ExxonMobil
ExxonMobil operates Block 15, one of Angola’s largest producing concessions, through its Esso Exploration Angola subsidiary. Block 15 contains the Kizomba A, Kizomba B, and Kizomba C FPSOs, which together have produced over 2 billion barrels since first oil. ExxonMobil has also invested in enhanced recovery techniques to slow the decline on mature Kizomba wells.
ExxonMobil holds interests in other blocks as a non-operating partner. The company’s long-term commitment to Angola appears firm, though capital allocation decisions are increasingly influenced by the relative attractiveness of Angola’s fiscal terms compared to competing deepwater basins in Guyana, Brazil, and Mozambique.
Chevron
Chevron operates Block 0 in the Cabinda enclave (Angola’s oldest producing area, onstream since the 1960s) and Block 14 in the deepwater Lower Congo Basin. Cabinda production is mature and declining, but Block 14’s Benguela-Belize-Lobito-Tomboco (BBLT) development continues to produce significant volumes.
Chevron’s Angola operations are managed through Cabinda Gulf Oil Company Limited (CABGOC), one of the longest-standing foreign operators in the country. The company’s presence in Cabinda predates Angola’s independence and has survived civil war, nationalisation debates, and multiple regime changes.
BP
BP operates two significant deepwater blocks:
- Block 18. Contains the Greater Plutonio FPSO, which has been producing since 2007 and remains a material contributor to BP’s global portfolio.
- Block 31. Contains the PSVM (Plutao, Saturno, Venus, Marte) development in ultra-deepwater, one of the most technically challenging operations in Angola.
BP has signalled a strategic rebalancing of its global portfolio toward lower-carbon assets, which creates uncertainty about the company’s long-term investment trajectory in Angola. However, existing operations continue to generate significant cash flow.
ENI
ENI operates Block 15/06 through its Angolan subsidiary and has been one of the most active developers of new projects in recent years:
- Agogo. An early-production system on Block 15/06 that has been progressively expanded, with multiple phases designed to bring total field output to approximately 40,000-50,000 bpd. Agogo represents one of the most significant recent discoveries in Angola and demonstrates the remaining prospectivity of the deepwater basin.
- Ndungu. Another development on Block 15/06 that ENI has advanced through the appraisal stage.
ENI’s aggressive development programme in Angola contrasts with the more cautious approach of some other majors and reflects the company’s strategic emphasis on African deepwater as a core production pillar.
Sonangol: National Oil Company in Transition
Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol) occupies a unique position as the state concessionaire in all oil blocks, a minority equity partner in most production-sharing agreements, and an operator in its own right on certain mature onshore and shallow-water blocks. Sonangol’s production as operator is modest – estimated at 50,000-70,000 bpd from legacy assets – but its role as the state’s representative in the petroleum sector gives it outsized influence.
Under President Lourenco, Sonangol has undergone the most significant restructuring in its history:
Divestiture of non-core assets. Sonangol previously held interests in banking (BPC), telecommunications (Unitel), real estate, aviation (TAAG), and other sectors that had little connection to its core petroleum mandate. The Lourenco administration has systematically spun off these holdings, in many cases channelling them into the PROPRIV privatisation pipeline.
Operational restructuring. Sonangol’s upstream and downstream operations have been separated, management layers reduced, and procurement processes reformed. The objective is to transform Sonangol from a sprawling conglomerate into a focused national oil company.
IPO preparation. The government has confirmed its intention to list a minority stake in Sonangol on BODIVA, which would be the single most transformative event in the history of Angola’s capital markets. The timing remains uncertain – government officials have referenced various target dates without committing to a firm timeline – but the restructuring programme is explicitly oriented toward creating an entity that meets the transparency and governance standards required for a public listing. The investment overview tracks PROPRIV developments including the Sonangol IPO timeline.
A Sonangol IPO would give investors direct exposure to Angola’s oil reserves and production, provide a benchmark valuation for the country’s petroleum assets, and dramatically expand BODIVA’s market capitalisation and liquidity. It would also raise complex governance questions about the relationship between a publicly listed company and its sovereign shareholder.
Fiscal Contribution
Oil revenues remain the dominant source of Angolan government income, despite ongoing diversification efforts:
| Fiscal Metric | 2024 Estimate | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Oil revenue | ~$10.5B | Approximately 60% of total fiscal revenue |
| Oil as % of exports | ~90%+ | Near-total dependency |
| Oil as % of GDP | ~25-30% | Including upstream and services |
| Production tax + income tax | Majority of oil revenue | Varies by contract type and oil price |
The fiscal regime for petroleum operations combines a Petroleum Production Tax (levied on gross production value), Petroleum Income Tax (on net income from petroleum activities), and Surface Tax (on concession area). The effective government take varies by block and contract vintage but typically ranges from 55-75% across the full range of PSA and concession terms. The tax guide provides additional detail on the petroleum fiscal framework and its interaction with general corporate taxation.
Angola’s extreme fiscal dependence on oil means that the government budget – and by extension, the entire macroeconomic framework including exchange-rate stability, debt sustainability, and social spending – is a leveraged bet on global crude prices. The government’s budget for 2024-2025 was calibrated to an assumed oil price of approximately $65-75/barrel. Sustained prices above this level generate surpluses; sustained prices below it create deficits that must be financed through debt, reserve drawdowns, or spending cuts.
Post-OPEC Strategy
Angola’s exit from OPEC in January 2024 was a watershed moment. The immediate catalyst was OPEC’s allocation of a production quota of approximately 1.11 million bpd to Angola – a figure that Luanda viewed as unrealistic given the country’s actual production capacity and insulting given its status as one of OPEC’s largest African members.
The deeper driver was strategic autonomy. Inside OPEC, Angola’s production decisions were constrained by cartel discipline. Outside OPEC, Angola can produce at maximum technical capacity, negotiate independently with buyers, and make investment decisions without reference to OPEC’s collective output-management strategy.
In practice, the impact of the OPEC exit has been modest – Angola was already producing below its OPEC quota because of geological decline, not voluntary restraint. The exit removed a ceiling that was not binding. However, it has diplomatic and commercial significance: Angola can market itself to IOCs as a jurisdiction without production constraints, and it avoids the reputational cost of failing to meet OPEC commitments.
The relationship with Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members remains cordial. Angola retains observer status and maintains bilateral energy diplomacy with Gulf producers. The geopolitical analysis examines how Angola’s post-OPEC positioning interacts with broader energy-market dynamics.
New Developments and Exploration
Despite the overall decline trend, several new projects provide a partial offset:
Begonia (TotalEnergies, Block 17/06). Expected to produce approximately 30,000 bpd, representing one of the largest near-term production additions.
Agogo Phases 2-3 (ENI, Block 15/06). Incremental production of 20,000-30,000 bpd from continued development of the Agogo discovery.
CLOV Phase 3 (TotalEnergies, Block 17). Infill drilling and subsea tiebacks to extend the productive life of the CLOV FPSO.
Ndungu (ENI, Block 15/06). Appraisal and early development of a new accumulation with estimated resources of 500 million to 1 billion barrels in place.
Pre-salt exploration. Several blocks in the Kwanza Basin (onshore and offshore) have been opened for exploration targeting pre-salt geological formations analogous to those that have yielded major discoveries in Brazil. Results to date have been mixed, but the geological potential is significant. Sonangol, TotalEnergies, and ENI hold the key exploration positions.
These developments could collectively add 80,000-120,000 bpd of new production over the 2025-2028 period, partially offsetting estimated declines of 100,000-150,000 bpd annually from mature fields. The net result is likely continued gradual decline, but at a slower pace than the 2018-2024 period – provided oil prices remain supportive of continued investment.
Investment Implications
Angola’s oil sector offers no growth story at the aggregate level. Production is in structural decline, and even optimistic new-development scenarios only slow the rate of decrease. However, the sector generates substantial cash flow – $10.5 billion in fiscal revenue alone in 2024 – and remains the foundation of Angola’s economy and capital-market infrastructure.
For investors, the key exposure vehicles are:
Sovereign bonds. Angola’s creditworthiness is fundamentally a function of oil-revenue adequacy. Bond investors are, in effect, taking a leveraged position on oil prices, Kwanza stability, and production volumes. The banking sector analysis notes that Angolan banks’ heavy allocation to government securities creates a transmission mechanism from oil prices to bank profitability.
Sonangol IPO. If and when it materialises, a Sonangol listing would provide direct equity exposure to Angola’s petroleum reserves. Valuation will depend on the percentage offered, the governance framework, and the dividend policy.
Services and logistics. Companies providing oilfield services, marine logistics, and engineering support to Angola’s upstream sector represent an indirect exposure to production activity. Several are incorporated in Angola and may eventually seek BODIVA listings.
Diversification plays. Paradoxically, the strongest investment case in Angola may be for the sectors that are not oil – banking, agriculture, telecommunications – precisely because they offer exposure to the diversification effort that Angola’s oil dependency makes so urgent.